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LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENTLY
PERFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES:
AN ECONOMIC THEORY
James D Palmer*
I Introduction
The law governing the recovery of negligently inflicted pure economic losses is complex
and confusing.1 The judicial inclination is typically to restrict liability, but the traditional
legal analysis is neither consistent nor convincing. In this article I focus on pure economic
losses caused by negligently performed financial services,2 and consider whether a "law
* LLM (Harvard). This article is based on a Chapter from my LLM thesis. I am grateful for the
help of a number of people in writing that thesis; in particular Professor Steven Shavell, Giel
Hoogeboom, Anne-Marie Brook and Alec Haydon. I have also benefited from feedback received
at seminars given to the Harvard Law School Seminar in Law and Economics and the Law and
Economics Association of New Zealand.
1 A pure economic loss is a financial loss suffered by a person in the absence of any injury to her
person or to her property. There are many articles which canvas this area of the law. See for
example, Karen M Hogg"Negligence and Economic Loss in England, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand" (1994) 23 International and Comparative LQ 116; B S Markesinis and Simon Deal<in
"The Random Element of their Lordships' Infallible Judgment: An Economic and Comparative
Analysis of the Tort of Negligence from Anns to Murphy" (1992) 55 MLR 619; Jane Stapleton "Duty
of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda" (1991) 107 LQR 249; Ann O'Brien "Limited
Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litigation for Negligent Infliction of Pure
Economic Loss" (1989) 31 Ariz L Rev 959; William Tetley "Damages and Economic Loss in Marine
Collision: Controlling the Floodgates" (1991) 22 J Mar L and Com 539; Daniel Jutras "Civil Law
and Pure Economic Loss: What are We Missing?" (1986-87) 12 CBU 295; and P S Atiyah
"Negligence and Economic Loss" (196D 83 LQR 248. See also Bruce Feldthusen Economic Negligence
(3 ed, Carswell, Scarborough, 1994).
2 Different economic considerations apply to different types of economic loss cases. Other typical
settings for pure economic losses are certain public authority cases (eg a public authority may
carelessly certify a bank that later collapses), relational economic losses caused by damage to the
property of a third party (eg a ditch digger may sever a power cable belonging to an electricity
supply authority and cause a factory to shut down for a number of hours) and quality defect
cases where a chattel or building is less valuable than anticipated. In all these areas, the fact that
the loss suffered was purely economic is typically treated by courts as a factor counting against
the imposition of liability.
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and economics" approach provides a superior framework for analysing the desirability of
imposing negligence liability than that provided by traditional legal analysis.3
Part II of this article briefly discusses the law regarding negligently performed financial
services and critiques the legal reasoning used to justify restricted liability. Part III
introduces the law and economics approach to negligence liability. The special
considerations which apply when a loss is purely economic and caused by a carelessly
performed financial service are analysed in Part IV. In Part V a rule of recovery based on
the economic analysis is presented and its application is discussed with respect to some of
the leading cases. My overall conclusions are that the economic approach provides a
powerful set of tools capable of explaining the major decisions in this area in terms of
economic efficiency and wealth maximisation, and that this explanation is more convincing
than the traditional legal analysis used in the cases themselves.
II The Legal Approach to Negligently Performed Fianncial Services
Financial services are intended to facilitate the organisation of the financial affairs of a
person or company, and are typically performed for the purpose of acquiring, transferring
or protecting income flows.4 If a financial service is performed negligently an income flow
may be misdirected causing a financial loss to the immediate requestor of the service (eg if
the requestor invests in an ailing company on the basis of an erroneously positive credit
report) and/or third parties (eg an intended beneficiary will suffer a financial loss if she is
excluded from a will due to a solicitor's negligence). The law distinguishes between these
two groups of claimants.
With respect to the requestor of the service, it is well established that by undertaking to
perform a financial service the provider assumes responsibility for its diligent performance
3 This article therefore attempts to address the need, remarked upon by a number of judges, for an
economic analysis of the merits of competing rules of recovery. For example, in Williams v
Attorney-General [1990] 1 NZLR 646, 681 Richardson J noted that the court was "not referred to
any economics and law analyses of the potential effects on behaviour in cost benefit terms of
imposing a duty of care" and suggested that "the Court should be furnished with arguments and
available analytical materials so that proposed policy alternatives are considered in an informed
way rather than resting on instinctive responses supported by generalized reasons." See also South
Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd u New Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR
282,305 (per Richardson J); Day v Mead [1987] 2 NZLR 431, 458 (per Somers J); Canadian National
Railway Co u Norsk Pacific Steamship Co ("Jervis Crown") (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289, 360 (per
McLachlin J); and Morgan Crucible Co Plc v Hill Samuel Bank Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 330, 335 (per
Hoffman J); over-ruled [1991] 1 All ER 148 (CA).
4 The following are all examples of financial services: the supply of a credit worthiness report by an
auditor or a bank, a will prepared by a solicitor, the valuation of a property by a surveyor and the
provision of insurance.
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and therefore owes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid causing economic (as well as
physical) losses.5
A different approach is apparent where the injured party is someone other than the
immediate requestor of the service. With respect to these "third party claims", the fact that
the loss is purely economic becomes a reason for restricting liability. For example, in the
context of an auditor's liability to third parties relying on audited financial statements,
Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman stated that:6
One of the most important distinctions always to be observed lies in the law's essentially
different approach to the different kinds of damage which one party may have suffered in
consequence of the acts or omissions of another. It is one thing to owe a duty of care to avoid
causing injury to the person or property of others. It is quite another to avoid causing others to
suffer purely economic loss.
The usual reason given for limiting liability to third parties is the fear that the extent of
liability may be disproportionate to the defendant's degree of fault and would dissuade her
from engaging in useful economic activity.7 However, this reasoning does not seem to bear
up to even a cursory analysis. First, it seems counter-intuitive that immunity should be
available because the loss may be very large - normally our response would be that this is
a reason pointing to the importance of imposing liability.8 If liability discourages economic
activity, it maybe because that activity is not desirable, at least unless a high level of care is
taken. Secondly, although the scope of liability for economic loss can be huge, in many cases
the potential liability is obvious and easily quantified yet liability is still denied. And
thirdly, why does this rationale result in such a stark distinction being drawn between
claims by the requestor of the service and claims by third parties?
5 See Medley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465,502-503, 526, 528-529 and 531-532;
Allied Finance and Investments Ltd v Haddow & Co [1983] NZLR 22; Day v Mead, above n 3; and
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] 3 WLR 761, 773-777.
6 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 618.
7 This was most famously articulated by Cardozo CJ in Ultramares Corp v Touche (1931) 255 NY 170,
179; 174 NE 441, 444 as the risk of exposing defendants to "a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." Similarly Lord Oliver in Caparo, above n 6,
632-633 noted that:
"The opportunities for the infliction of pecuniary loss from the imperfect performance of
everyday tasks on the proper performance of which people rely for regulating their affairs are
illimitable and the effects are far reaching. A defective bottle of ginger beer may injure a single
consumer but the damage stops there. A single statement may be repeated endlessly with or
without the permission of its author and may be relied on in a different way by many different
people."
8 See W Bishop "Economic Loss in Tort" (1982) 2 Oxford J of Legal Stud 1,1-3; and Scott Group Ltd v
McFarlane [1978] 1 NZLR 553, 572 (per Woodhouse D.
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Given the inconsistencies in the underlying rationale for limiting liability to third
parties, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no generally accepted liability test.9 In
some cases, the pure economic loss distinction has been all but eliminated and liability
predicated on the loss being reasonably foreseeable.10 Looking at the cases where the
distinction has been invoked, a variety of approaches are apparent. Sometimes the question
asked is whether the plaintiff assumed responsibility for the loss suffered.11 In other cases,
the court has stated that liability will only be imposed where "the third party's reliance
was the very purpose of the transaction."12 In recent pure economic loss cases the nature of
the loss has tended not to be central to the inquiry, but merely a factor telling against the
imposition of the duty,13 and not a sufficient reason to prevent the imposition of a duty
where "practical justice" requires a remedy.14
In these cases traditional legal reasoning is unable to offer a coherent explanation of
whether, and how, liability should be limited. In the remainder of this article I present an
economic analysis of financial service cases and consider whether this approach provides a
better explanatory theory.
III The Economic Approach to Negligence Liability
The law and economics approach analyses legal doctrine from an efficiency perspective.
In the context of negligence liability the goal is to create incentives that will minimise the
total cost of accidents to society. This cost includes both the cost of any precautions taken
and the cost of any accidents that still occur. Cost minimisation will occur if potential
9 The sentiments that "the courts rely on an array of distinctions whose plausibility and cogency are
profoundly suspect" (see A C Hutchinson and R Maisey "Blurred Visions: The Politics of Civil
Obligation" in Ken Cooper-Stephenson and Elaine Gibson (eds) Tort Theory (Captus University
Press, 1993) 276, 290) and that within this body of cases "support can be found for almost any
position whatsoever" (R Soloman and B Feldthusen "Recovery for Pure Economic Loss: The
Exclusionary Rule" in Klar (ed) Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Butterworths, Toronto, 1977) 167,
173) are entirely appropriate to this subset of pure economic loss cases. See also W Bishop
"Negligent Misrepresentation through Economists' Eyes" (1980) 96 LQR 360, 360-362; and Bishop
(1982), above n 8, 1.
10 See for example Scott Group, above n 8, 574-576 (per Woodhouse D and 583 (per Cooke J); H.
Rosenblum Inc v Adler 461 A2d 138 (NJ 1983); Citizens State Bank v Timm, Schmidt & Co (1983) 355
NW2d 361 (Wiss); and Touche Ross & Co v Commercial Union Ins Co (198D 514 So2d 315 (Miss).
11 See Hedley Byrne, above n 5.
12 See for example Caparo, above n 6; Credit Alliance Corp v Arthur Anderson & Co 483 NE2d 110 (NY
1985); and Raritan River Steel Co v Cherry, Bekaert 8 Holland (1988) 367 SE2d 609 (NIC).
13 South Pac¢ic, above n 3,294 (per Cooke ID. Also, in both Deloitte Haskins and Sells v National Mutual
Lffe Nominees Ltd [1993] 3 WLR 347 and Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] 1
NZLR 513 the Privy Council paid little attention to the fact that the loss was purely economic.
14 White v Jones [1995] 2 WLR 187,204 (per Lord Goff).
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accident creators take those precautions that reduce expected accident losses by more than
the cost of the precautions.15
Example A
This theory can be demonstrated by a simple example. Suppose that Piper is laying a
water main on her land and that there is a risk that it will leak and flood her neighbour,
Drenched. If the water main leaks then losses of $1,000 are caused. There are three levels
of care which Piper can take to reduce the chance of the water main leaking. The following
table shows the costs of each level of care, the corresponding probabilities of the water
main leaking, the expected accident costs and the expected total costs.
Table 1
Level of Cost of Accident Expected accident Expected total
care care probability losses cost
none $0 20% (20% x $1,000)=$200 $200
moderate $50 10% (10% x $1,000)=$100 $150
high $300 0% (0% X $1,000)=$0 $300
The optimal level of care is that which minimises the expected total cost of laying the
water main. It can be seen from Table 1 that in this case the moderate care level is socially
optimal. If costless bargaining occurred between the parties they would agree to this level
of care.16 However, the existence of transaction costs (such as the remoteness of the parties,
the number of parties involved, the willingness of the parties to bargain and imperfect
knowledge) often prevents optimal contracting and creates a role for negligence liability as
a surrogate for voluntary exchanges. If courts set due care (ie the level of care that must be
15 See generally Steven Shavell Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1987), 6-9, William M Landes and Richard A Posner The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1987), 85-88; and Richard A Posner Economic Analysis of
Law (4 ed, Little Brown, Boston, 1992), 163-168. The analysis in this article is restricted to the
negligence standard of liability. In particular, the possibility of strict liability is not considered.
Under the economic theory, both these regimes ensure that optimal care is taken by potential
injurers, but they differ with respect to (1) the activity levels of the potential injurers, (2) the care
and activity levels of potential victims, and (3) administrative costs. Accounts of these
differences can be found in Shavell (1987), 5-46; and Landes and Posner (1983, 54-84.
16 In the absence of liability Drenched would be willing to pay Piper up to $100 for her to take
moderate care rather than no care. The cost of moderate care is only $50, so the parties will
contract for Piper to take moderate care for a price between $50 and $100 (the exact price will be
determined by bargaining between the Piper and Drenched). The parties will not contract for
high care because Drenched will not pay more than the reduction in accident costs ($200), which
is less that the cost of high care ($300).
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taken for accident causers to avoid liability) at the theoretically optimal level and correctly
determine the level of care actually taken, then negligence liability will induce potential
accident causers to take the optimal level of care.17 In Example A, if a court sets the level of
due care at moderate care, then Piper will be induced to behave optimally. She will evaluate
the costs that she will face for each prospective level of care. If she takes no care she will be
liable for any losses she causes with an expected cost to her of $200. If she takes moderate
care she will spend $50 on precautions and escape liability for any losses because she has
taken due care. The water main may still leak, but if it does then the cost will be borne by
Drenched. Therefore Piper's total cost will be $50. If she takes high care she will be
spending $300 on precautions. The extra $250 spent on precautions above the moderate
care level does not benefit Piper as she is not liable for any losses either way. Given these
choices Piper will chose moderate care, which is optimal.
I V The Economic Approach to Negligently Pedormed Financial Services
A The desirability offiabilityfor negligently performed financial services
Determining the desirability of liability for professional financial services is more
complicated than determining the desirability of liability in the simple example just
discussed. There are three main arguments against imposing liability. First, since many
financial services merely channel income flows, it may be argued that net wealth in society
is not affected by the level of care taken. That is, even if the service provider is negligent,
nothing is damaged or destroyed; money is merely channeled. Judicial resources should
therefore not be wasted in ensuring that reasonable care is taken. Secondly, many financial
services result in a significant benefit for which the producer is unable to charge. In these
circumstances, if liability is imposed, the producer will face the full social cost of her
services but will be unable to appropriate the full social benefit. The provision of the
service will therefore be sub-optimal. Finally, th.. administrative costs of negligence
liability may outweigh the benefits of liability. I will examine these arguments in turn.
B The social cost ofnegligently performed financial services
Often the aim of a financial service is to create or prevent an income transfer in order to
acquire a financial advantage that would otherwise accrue to another party. Resources are
therefore spent on an activity that does not increase the net level Of wealth in society. If a
lack of care simply means that wealth is not distributed in the intended manner, then it may
be argued that, unlike damage to physical property (such as the flooded land in Example A),
17 For discussions of this proposition and mathematical proofs see Landes and Posner (1987), above
n 15, 29-83; and Shavell (1987), above n 15, 5-72.
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there is no social cost associated with negligent performance and therefore it is inefficient to
impose liability.18 Consider the following example:
Example B
Suppose that an investor is considering loaning $100,000 to the Acme Company. The
investor requests the Acme Company to arrange for a credit reference to be supplied by its
bank. The cost of the bank performing a thorough credit check is $1,000 and the cost of a
less thorough check is $500. The expensive check is always accurate. The cheaper check,
however, will fail to detect the existence of severe financial problems in 20% of the cases
where those problems exist. There is a 10% chance that the Acme Company is in fact in
severe financial trouble. The investor will only lend the money if a credit check is
performed and is favourable. The probability of a loan being made is therefore 90% in the
case of high care, and 92% in the case of low care since 2% of the time the credit check will
be favorable even though the Company is in financial trouble (ie 10% x 20%). If the loan is
made and the Acme Company is viable then there is a benefit to society of $20,000 from the
investment (for simplicity we will assume that the whole benefit is taken by the investor). If
the loan is made and the Acme Company is in financial trouble none of the money will be
repaid, instead it will go to pay some of Acme's current debts.
Table 2
Level Cost Probability Expected gain to Expected gain Expected
of of care of the loan investor to other social welfare
care being made creditors
low $500
90% + (90%x$20,000) - 2%x$100,000 $18,000 - $500
20%x10% (2%x$100,000) = = $2,000 = $17,500
=92% $16,000
18 The idea that there is no immediate social cost associated with many financial losses will be
foreign to many lawyers. It is important to remember that law and economics is concerned with
the net cost to society of a particular transaction or accident. That is, a distinction is drawn
between the loss of real societal resources and mere transfers from one economic actor to another.
The economic analysis of laws against theft is illustrative. Theft, of a car for example, is not a cost
to society per se - it is a mere transfer of wealth from the owner to the thief. The economic
explanation for the illegality of such forced transfers is that if they were legal, societal resources
would be wasted on owners' efforts to protect their resources and thieves' efforts to thwart that
protection. See Posner (1992), above n 15, 208. This argument is not applicable to all categories of
pure economic loss cases and therefore illustrates the importance of a disaggregated analysis (see
above n 2).
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high
$1000 90%
90%x$20,000 =
$18,000
$18,000 -
$1,000 =
$17,000
0
It is clear from Table 2 that it is mutually beneficial for the investor and the bank if the
bank takes the high level of care. This results in an increase in the expected gain to the
investor of $2,000 ($18,000 - $16,000) at a cost to the bank of an extra $500. But it appears
that the taking of care is not optimal from society's point of view. The extra care is a cost to
society with no corresponding gain because the collapse of the company does not make the
money disappear - it is simply transferred to the lucky creditors. Therefore, at least at first
glance, there is no net social cost associated with the pure economic loss and imposing
liability upon the careless auditor would be a waste of society's resources.
However, even if a service merely influences income flows, imposing liability may still
produce indirect social benefits. First, a by-product of some financial services may be an
improved allocation of scarce resources. Like many financial services, the bank's credit
reference in Example B benefits society by promoting the efficient allocation of society's
resources. The private incentives to move the economy closer to equilibrium are part of the
"invisible hand" of resource allocation.19 Ensuring that the auditor takes reasonable care
will improve the resource allocation decisions of investors which is an indirect (and hard
to measure) benefit to society.
Secondly, even if we think it is socially optimal for less care to be taken than the parties
would choose, not imposing liability may be futile, or even more costly, because the parties
will seek the same result through other means.2( This is because the actions of an individual
are governed by the individual costs and benefits she faces and not the social costs and
benefits of her actions. So, in Example B, if there is no liability on the bank, then the
investor will face the 2% risk of losing $100,000. Although society may be indifferent
whether the investor or the other creditors have this money, the investor certainly is not.
Therefore if the bank is not under a duty of care, the investor (and all other potential
19 For example, this is the justification for encouraging capital market traders to acquire information
even though their trading gains are another trader's losses. See Ronald J Gilson & Reinier H
Kraakman "The mechanisms of Market Efficiency" (1984) 70 Va L Rev 549, 623. It is, of course,
very difficult to know if the ability to capture these private benefits creates an incentive to spend
resources on financial services that is socially correct or too large or too small because it is
impossible to put an accurate value on improved resource allocations. See James Boyle "A Theory
of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading" (1992) 80 Calif L
Rev 1413, 1449 (note 83).
20 See Posner (1992), above n 15, 191-192; and Harris and Veljanovski "Liability for Economic Loss in
Tort" in Furmston (ed) The Iaw of Tort: Policies and Trends in Liability for Damage to Property and
Economic Loss (Duckworth, London, 1986) 48, 50-51.
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investors) will take other, typically less efficient, precautions or investigations or incur the
extra transaction costs of requiring the Acme Company to request a credit reference from the
bank and to secure a contractual warranty to the effect that the bank took reasonable
21
care.
Finally, the imposition of liability on the professional is desirable from a social point of
view if the beneficiary of the service is risk averse and the professional is less risk averse
or has cheaper access to insurance.22 As Richardson J remarked in Allied Finance and
Investments Ltd v Haddow & Co:23
[T]o the extent that the action in negligence is a loss allocation mechanism there is much to be
said for the view that where in relationships of proximity laymen rely on the advice of
professionals the costs of that careless advice should be borne by the professional advisers who
are in a position to protect themselves by professional negligence insurance and in that way
spread the risk.
In summary, even where a financial service is aimed at directing income flows there are
still benefits associated with improving the quality of the service through the imposition of
liability. Even if those benefits are smaller than the costs of liability, a failure to impose
liability may be counter-productive because the parties will follow their private costs and
benefits and seek to produce the same result through more expensive channels.
C The problem of appropriability
The second argument for restricting liability is the so-called "problem of
appropriability". The performer of a financial service will frequently be unable to
appropriate the full benefit which results from the service she performs.24 For example, an
21 Courts have recognised that the imposition of a duty of care may avoid the performance of
socially inefficient duplicate services. For example, the Court in H. Rosenblum, Inc v Adler, above n
10, 150 felt that by imposing liability on the auditor the accuracy of audits would improve and
there would be a reduction in the need for "costly separate investigations by each party at
interest ... which are so much sand in the economic machine."
22 Ifa party is risk averse and insurance is unavailable then the bearing of risk by that person is a real
cost to society (see Shavell (1987) above n 15, 206-208; and Harris and Veljanovski, above n 20,
56). Therefore where insurance is unavailable and one or more of the parties is risk averse, the
costs of risk bearing should be taken into account in determining whether or not a duty of care
should be imposed.
23 Above n 5, 31. Similarly Hoffman J in Morgan Crucible, above n 3,335, referring to the relationship
between a residential house buyer and a property valuer, noted that the typical house buyer "is a
person of modest means and making the most expensive purchase of his or her life. He is very
unlikely to be insured against the manifestation of inherent defects. The surveyor can protect
himself relatively easily by insurance."
24 Bishop (1980), above n 9, 364 makes this point in the context of the production of information.
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audited financial statement may be utilised by various third parties who the auditor is not
able to charge. Similarly a solicitor who creates a will confers a benefit on the
beneficiaries, but can only charge the testator. Additionally, whenever a service improves
the allocation of resources in society, everyone in society benefits indirectly, but only the
person who requests the service pays. What is the effect if a financial service provider is
unable to capture the full benefit of a service?
If the performer of a service cannot charge all the people who benefit from that service
then the level of service provision will be less than optimal. One response would be for the
legal system to attempt to require all the people who benefit from the service to pay a fee to
the performer.25 But this would be extremely costly when the benefits are widely dispersed.
An alternative approach, evident in the law of negligence, is to compensate financial
services for being unable to appropriate all the benefits they create by reducing the costs
they face through restricted liability.26 The difficult question is to determine exactly how
much immunity should be granted. In determining the appropriate extent of negligence
liability a court must balance expanding liability (which improves the quality of the
services that are provided) and contracting liability (which increases the quantity of
services that will be provided). Determining the optimal scope of liability is intractable in
the abstract and very complicated for any given case.
D The administrative costs Of negligence liability
If the administrative costs of tort liability outweigh the benefits from creating incentives
to take reasonable care then imposing liability is undesirable.27 The administrative costs of
tort liability (that is, the time and effort spent by injurers, victims, legal counsel and the
judiciary) create a wedge between private incentives to sue and the social desirability of an
action.28 If these costs exceed the social benefit from liability then imposing liability is
25 The law of restitution, which sometimes requires payment for a benefit provided in the absence
of a contract, can be understood in this way.
26 Lord Bridge in Caparo, above n 6, at 621 correctly felt that a failure to restrict third party liability
would "confer on the world at large a quite unwarranted entitlement to appropriate for their
own purposes the benefit of expert knowledge or professional expertise attributed to the maker of
the statement."
27 See Harris and Veljanovski, above n 20, 51-53; and Shavell (1987),above n 15,265-267.
28 In theory, negligence liability should be costless - the injurer should be induced to take the
optimal level of care and hence would not be found liable if an action was taken, so no actions
should be taken. There are, however, a number of reason why negligence actions are taken. An
injurer may fail to take due care if she suffers a momentary lapse of care, she does not take
reasonable care because she believes that her negligence will not be punished (for example if she
is judgment proof), or she incorrectly calculates the level at which the court will set due care.
Alternatively, because of errors and misperceptions, victims may take actions even if due care
was taken. See Shavell (1983, above n 15, 83-84, and 268.
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undesirable. The strength of this argument against liability will increase where: (1) the
administrative costs are high (for example, if the losses are widespread, if the value of the
loss is uncertain and will be disputed at trial, or if the level of care that the injurer took is
hard to measure and will be disputed at trial); or (2) the benefits from liability are low (for
example, if there are already other procedures in place to ensure that reasonable care is
taken, or if reasonable care can be achieved by imposing liability for a subset of the losses).
A financial service case may give rise to a number of the factors which tell against the
imposition of liability - there may be a large number of potential claimants, the costs of
proving the economic losses and the level of care taken may be high, and professional
organizations often regulate the quality of services provided by their members. Courts
should therefore be sensitive to the administrative costs that their decisions will give rise
to, and refuse liability where the resulting administrative costs outweigh the benefits of
improved care.
E Summary
A number of points emerge from the above economic analysis. There are two kinds of
social benefits from imposing liability: (1) for those services that directly improve social
welfare (eg the provision of insurance) the liability-induced quality improvement directly
benefits society; and (2) properly performed financial services typically produce an indirect
but important benefit by improving resource allocations and, in some cases, by efficiently
allocating risk. Even in cases where these benefits seem small and hard to measure, liability
still seems desirable because the parties involved will follow their private costs and
benefits rather than the social costs and benefits of their actions and try to impose liability
through other more costly channels. This conclusion must, however, be qualified and
liability limited for two reasons: (1) it may be desirable to limit liability when the provider
of the service is unable to charge all the people who benefit from the service; and (2)
liability should not be imposed when the administrative costs seem likely to outweigh the
benefits.
V A Rule of Liability Consistent with the Economic Approach
A An appropriability-based rule Of liability
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that there is no simple liability rule that will
ensure optimal levels of care and provision for all financial services. Evaluating cases on
an individual basis is not an attractive option either; the complexity of calculating the exact
social costs and benefits of a service and the benefits that the provider is able to capture is
daunting to say the least. The best that can realistically be hoped for is a general rule of
liability that provides an approximate solution and suggestions as to when departures from
the rule should be made.
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A prima facie rule of liability that is consistent with both the economic analysis and
most of the leading cases is this. The provider of a financial service should owe a prima
facie duty of care to the claimant if:
1 the claimant was, or could have been, charged directly or indirectly for the financial
benefit that would have been provided (or the financial loss that would have been
prevented) had the service been properly performed; and
2 the provider could have reasonably foreseen the way in which the performance of the
service was going to affect the claimant.
From an economic perspective, this rule has a number of desirable features: the rule is
clear and reasonably certain in application and will therefore limit administrative costs;
liability is restricted to those third party claimants from whom the provider can
appropriate the benefit she creates so that the provider's expected liability is reduced as a
trade-off for revenue she cannot collect; desirable disclosure incentives are established
which "creates value because if the [performer of the service] foresees the loss, he will be
able to prevent it more efficiently"29 and this knowledge allows the performer to set an
appropriate price for the service; and transaction costs should be saved since proximate
parties in relationships such as those envisaged by the rule would seek to impose liability
through more expensive channels were it not imposed through the law of negligence.
The next section of this paper demonstrates that this prima facie liability rule is capable
of rationalising most of the leading cases in this area. The following section discusses when
the economic reasoning suggests that the rule should be departed from and shows that these
suggested departures also track the case law.
B Liability under the general rule of appropriability
1 Liability to the requestor Of the service
If a person directly requests a financial service then the two requirements of the prima
facie rule will usually be met. That is, the provider will be able to charge the requestor and
reasonably foresee her reliance. This result accords with the current legal position. For
example the Court of Appeal in Haddoub' imposed a duty of care on the defendant solicitors
who had agreed to certify that the security their client was offering to the plaintiff was
fully effective. In these circumstances it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff
29 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules" (1989) 99 Yale LJ 87, 101 (footnote omitted). See also William Bishop "The
Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance" 12 J Legal Stud 241, 254.
30 Above n 5; and the other cases referred to at n 5 above.
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would not be repaid if the security was ineffective and the defendant would have been able
to indirectly charge for the service through its client.31
An interesting question, upon which the economic approach can shed some light, arises
where the requestor and provider are in a contractual relationship. Where this is the case,
courts sometimes become reluctant either to imply a contractual term requiring reasonable
care to be taken, or to allow concurrent liability in tort. This is based on the "classical"
view of contract which sees the explicitly agreed to contractual terms as being definitive of
the parties' obligations to each other.32 The difficulty with this analysis is that it does not
account for the possibility that transaction costs may prevent the complete specification of a
contract.33 Restricting contractual obligations to the explicit voluntarily assumed
obligations and refusing to impose additional obligations in tort (or to imply equivalent
contractual terms) will therefore result in non-optimal relationships.34 The better view,
which seems to have gained ascendancy in the courts, is therefore that subject always to the
31 The concept of being able to charge for the service is a broad one; no charge has to be made in
fact and it includes the possibility of passing the charge through another party. In many of these
cases the payment will not be in a form that would be recognised by a court as legal consideration.
Instead the performer may be acting in the expectation of some form of reciprocation at a later
date or an indirect benefit from another party. For example the provision of information by a
professional may confer a benefit on one of the professional's clients from whom she can expect
indirect compensation. In Hedley Byrne, above n 5,529 Lord Devlin suggested that "[t]he service
that a bank performs in giving a reference is not done simply out of a desire to assist commerce. It
would discourage the customers of the bank if their deals fell through because the bank had
refused to testify to their credit when it was good."
32 See for example Rowlands v Collow [1992] 1 NZLR 178, 190; Sinclair Horder O'Malley v National
Insurance Company of New Zealand Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 706, 719; and Greater Nottingham Co-op v
Cementation [1989] 1 QB 71.
33 For a number of reasons it is often efficient for the parties not to specify every detail of an
agreement. For example if the negotiation costs are high, contingencies are remote or if the parties
know that the court will imply certain terms, then an under-specified agreement is likely to be
optimal. See Steven Shavell "Damage Measures for the Breach of Contract" (1980) 11 Bell J Econ
466; Ayres and Gertner, above n 29,92-93; Harris and Veljanovski, above n 20,46; and William
Bishop "Economic Loss: Economic Theory and Emerging Doctrine" in Furmston (1986), above n
20,73,78.
34 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel "The Economic Structure of Corporate Law" (1989) 89
Colum L Rev 1416. Similarly, Bishop (1986), above n 33, 78 argues that since it may be efficient to
have under-specified contracts "there is no sharp break between contract and tort." He goes on
to say that "[i]n this model of the law tort is a kind of giant standard form contract which
regulates investment in accident precautions by allowing a lawsuit if the contract is breached',
i.e. if a tort is committed. The duty of care required is 'all care whose cost is justified by the benefit
of the procedures, but no more'. Thus the terms of this 'contract' are just those that the parties as
economic men would themselves negotiate in a perfect market."
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express terms of the contract, a promise to exercise reasonable care and skill should be
implied,35 or concurrent liability allowed in tort.36
2 Liability to third parties a#ected by the service
Where the provider of the service charged, or could have charged, the third party
claimant for the provision of the service (typically by channeling the charge through the
person who actually requests the service) and the provider could have reasonably foreseen
the manner in which the third party was going to be affected if the service was negligently
performed then, according to the prima facie rule, a duty of care should be imposed. After
answering an initial objection to the imposition of third party liability I will show that this
liability rule is consistent with a large body of case law.
The preliminary issue is this. Since a harmed third party typically could have sought
contractual protection from the performer of the service but did not, why should the court
interfere37 This argument incorrectly assumes that an optimal contractual solution is
likely. This assumption is unwarranted for two reasons. First, third party losses are
generally remote contingencies. Once a loss has occurred it may seem reasonable to say that
the disappointed third party should have sought contractual protection. However, from an
ex ante perspective, third party losses occur in a very small fraction of all those
transactions that may affect third parties. Secondly, the large transaction costs involved
will typically prevent third parties from seeking contractual protection for these remote
35 In Haddow, above n 5,24 for example, Cooke J considered that if a contract had existed between
Allied Finance and the solicitors "it would have imported a duty of reasonable care." See also
South Pacific, above n 3,308 (per Richardson J); Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett, Stubbs & Kemp
[1979] Ch 384; and Merrett Syndicates, above n 5,788.
36 The issue of concurrent liability has generated a great deal of conflicting judicial opinion and
academic commentary. The House of Lords has recently ruled in favour of allowing concurrent
liability, see Merrett Syndicates, above n 5. This accords with Rowlands v Collow, above n 32; Central
Trust Company v Rafuse [1986] 31 DLR (4th) 481; Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd u Hett, Stubbs e Kemp,
above n 35 and Lancashire and Cheshire Association of Baptist Churches Inc v Howard & Seddon
Partnership (a finn) [1993] 3 All ER 467; but compare Simms Jones Ltd v Protochem Trading NZ Ltd
[1993] 3 NZLR 369; Tai Hing v Liu Bank [1986] AC 80; Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington
Glass Ltd (No 2) [1988] QB 758; South Pacific, above n 3; and Downsview Nominees, above n 13. See
also Christine French "The Contract/Tort Dilemma" (1983) 5 Otago LR 236; and Schlosser "Some
Recent Developments in the Law of Limitation of Actions, Concurrent Liability and Pure
Economic Loss" (198D 25 Alberta Law Review 388. Merrett Syndicates was followed by Thomas J
in Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd [1995] 2 NZLR 30, 74 and his Honour regarded this decision
as ending the controversy over concurrent liability.
37 For example, Goldberg "Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Really Necessary?"
(1988) 17 J Leg Stud 295, 300 (footnote omitted) argues that there is no need for tortious liability in
cases like these because "it would not be very difficult to have [service providers] assume the
liability by contract rather than by having it imposed by tort."
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contingencies.38 It is therefore advantageous to allow a direct action in tort,39 and this is
the approach that most courts take.40
The decision of Cardozo J in Glanzer v Shepard41 is a good starting point for analysing
the case law. Here the plaintiff was purchasing beans at a price that was to be based on
their weight as determined by a public weigher hired by the seller. The weigher negligently
certified the weight higher than it actually was and the plaintiff purchaser sued the weigher
to recover the resulting overpayment. The Court allowed the claim on the grounds that the
weigher knew that he had been hired by the seller for the very purpose of effecting this
transaction. Liability is also supported by the prima facie rule of appropriability-based
liability - the weigher was in a position to indirectly charge the plaintiff purchaser for the
service and he knew the scope of the losses that would be caused by his negligence.
The English decision in Smith v Bush2 is similar. The plaintiff was a house purchaser
who relied upon a negligent valuation made by a surveyor acting for a building society that
was considering granting the plaintiff a mortgage. The fee for the survey was paid for by
the plaintiff and the surveyor knew that the plaintiff would rely on the information in
deciding whether or not to purchase the property. Lord Templeman concluded, consistently
with the rule of appropriability-based liability, that:43
38 To list a few examples: the third party may not have any contact with either the requestor or the
provider; even if the third party has a relationship with the requestor, the issue of third party
liability may be quite peripheral to that relationship and to the relationship between the requestor
and the provider; the third party may not have any information about the agreement between
the requestor and the provider; and timing problems may obstruct a simultaneous agreement
between the three parties.
39 A possible exception is where the parties are well informed and the contracts between the
requester and the provider and the requestor and the third party are in reality two sides of an
overall agreement between all three. An example of a quality defect case involving this issue is
Simaan General Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No 2), above n 36. Here the plaintiffs
employed a subcontractor to erect a glass curtain. The subcontractors arranged for the supply of
the glass by the defendant. The plaintiff attempted to sue the defendant in negligence. The
English Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiffs claim as there was no reason to depart from the
"normal chain of liability" where the plaintiffs would sue the contractors who would sue the
defendant. The court was clearly worried that the individual bargains between the parties would
be subverted and a mockery would be made of the contractual negotiations (at 772,775,782-783,
and 785-786).
40 See Medley Byrne, above n 5; Scott Group, above n 8 and Smith v Bush [1990] 1 AC 831; but compare
South Pacific, above n 3, at 308, 319 and 326.
4 1 Glanzer v Shepard (1922) 233 NY 236. See also Arenson v Arenson [1977] AC 405.
42 Above n 39.
43 Above n 39,847.
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[T]he valuer assumes responsibility to both mortgagee and purchaser by agreeing to carry out a
valuation for mortgage purposes knowing that the valuation fee has been paid by the
purchaser and knowing that the valuation will probably be relied on by the purchaser in order
to decide whether or not to enter into a contract to purchase the house.
These two cases may be contrasted with the famous case of Ultramares Corp v Touche.44
The defendants were auditors who negligently prepared a certified balance sheet of the
Stern Company. The certificate was shown to the plaintiffs who lent money to Stern on the
strength of it and sued the defendants when Stern went bankrupt. The reasons given by
Cardozo CJ for not imposing liability are the same reasons that liability would not be
imposed under the appropriability-based rule of liability. Cardozo CJ explained that:45
Nothing was said [to the accountants] as to the persons to whom [the accounts] would be
shown or the extent or number of transactions in which they would be used. In particular
there was no mention of the plaintiff .... The range of the transactions in which a certificate of
the audit might be expected to play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities of the
business that was mirrored in the summary.
Applying these principles to the more recent cases in this area, the more restrictive
stance taken in cases such as Caparo is preferable. This approach was summarised by Lord
Bridge who stated that an accountant should only be liable to third parties if:46
[He] knew that his statement would be communicated to the plaintiff, either as an individual
or as a member of an identifiable class, specifically in connection with a particular transaction
or transactions of a particular kind ... and that the plaintiff would be very likely to rely on it for
the purpose of deciding whether or not to enter on that transaction or on a transaction of that
kind."
The "reasonable foreseeability" approach taken in New Zealand and a number of
American States should therefore be rejected as it casts the net too widely for this class of
47
case.
44 Above n 7. On the liability of auditors to third parties see generally John W Bagby and John C
Ruhnka "The Controversy Over Third Party Rights: Toward More Predictable Parameters Of
Auditor Liability" (1987) 22 Ga L Rev 149; Goldberg (1988), above n 37; and Bruce Chapman
"Limited Auditors' Liability: Economic Analysis and the Theory of Tort Law" (1992) 20 Can Bus U
180.
45 Above n 7, 255 NY 170, 174; 174 NE 441, 442.
46 Above n 6, 621. See also Bily v Arthur Young & Co (1992) 834 P2d 745, 733 (Cal); Candler v Crane,
Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164, 184-185 (per Lord Denning); Scott Group, above n 8, 266 (per
Richmond P); and B.D.C. Ltd v Hofstrand Farms Ltd (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 1.
47 See cases cited above n 10.
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C Fine Tuning Liability
1 Restricting liability
In some circumstances, it is desirable to depart from the prima facie rule of
appropriability-based liability either to restrict or to enlarge liability.
Liability should be more restrictive than the prima facie rule suggests when: (1) it is
possible to identify a significant external benefit from the service that is not matched by a
corresponding reduction in liability for the provider; (2) liability to a particular class of
people would give rise to very high administrative costs without a correspondingly large
benefit to society; or (3) conflicting duties would be created.
An example of a case in the first category is South Pacijic Manufacturing Co Ltd v New
Zealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd.48 The New Zealand Court of Appeal
had to decide whether an insurance investigator employed by an insurance company owes a
duty of care to an insured person when they investigate that person's claim. The plaintiff
claimed that the investigator's report was negligently prepared and had resulted in losses
due to a police prosecution and the insurance company's refusal to honour the claim. Here
there is a clear uncompensated external benefit of the investigator's service that deserves
protection. The actions of the insurance investigator create a benefit to society by
discovering evidence of arson. Often, as in this case, the law has already created a special
set of rules to provide appropriate incentives for activities that create extraordinary
externalities such as this. The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution,49 which are
stricter than those needed to establish negligence, embody the public interest in private
detection of crime and produce an efficient outcome.50 The court rejected the duty of care
argument and prevented the plaintiff from circumventing the stricter rules as to liability for
malicious prosecution.51
48 Above n 3.
49 The plaintiff must prove that the defendant set in motion a criminal prosecution acting
maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause.
50 The law relating to malicious prosecution has a sound economic basis. The initiation of criminal
proceedings by members of the public creates a large uncompensated benefit to society. To
encourage reporting of crimes, the law does not judge reports to the police by the normal
standards of negligence or defamation, but has narrower rules of liability for malicious
prosecution. See Posner (1992), above n 15, 213 making a similar point in the context of the
qualified privilege defence to defamation.
51 As a general rule a cause of action in negligence should not be allowed when the facts are
covered by a more restrictive rule of recovery that reflects an efficient result for society. See South
Pac(fic, above n 3, 301-304, 309, 314, 319, and 326; Bell-Booth Group Ltd v Attorney General [1989] 3
NZLR 148; Bafour v Attorney-General [1991] 1 NZLR 519; and Downsview Nominees, above n 13,
525; but compare Spring v Guardian Assurance [1994] 3 All ER 129.
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Another factor which may make the imposition of a duty of care owed to a third party
inappropriate is where this would prevent the provider performing her obligations to the
requestor. If this is the case then a duty should not be imposed as this would subvert the
agreement between the requestor and the provider. A more efficient solution is to require
the third party to protect her own interests without relying on the service provider. For
example, a lawyer does not normally owe a duty to the party her client is contracting with
or litigating against as this would impede the lawyer's ability to fulfil her obligations to her
client.52
2 Expanding liability
Liability should be wider that the prima facie rule suggests when the provider can
capture most of the benefits from the service and would not otherwise face liability for the
full costs of the service. An example of this is where the rule does not give any party the
ability to sanction the careless performance of the service. For example, under the prima
facie rule a solicitor who has accepted instructions to make a will would not normally owe
a duty of care to the intended beneficiaries. So if the testator dies and the solicitor has
negligently failed to implement the will an unusual result occurs: "The only person who has
a valid claim against the solicitor [the executor of the estate] has suffered no loss, and the
only person who has suffered a loss has no valid claim."53 The sanction of a negligence
action by a disappointed beneficiary provides the only generally effective "incentive for
lawyers to conform their conduct to a standard of reasonable care.',54 If such an action was
not allowed then there would be a real social cost as the testator would have to seek a more
expensive method of ensuring that her intentions are carried out.55
52 See Haddow, above n 5,24; Mid-Northern Fertilisers Ltd v Connell Lamb Gerard & Co (1991) 3 NZBLC
102,032; Farrington u Rose McBride & Ptners [1985] 1 NZLR 81; and Mouat v Clark Boyce (1991) 1
NZConvC 190-917. Similarly, in Downsview Nominees, above n 13, 523-525 the problem of
inconsistent duties influenced the Privy Council's refusal to impose a duty of care on a receiver
and manager appointed by a first debenture holder with respect to interests of subsequent
debenture holders.
53 Ross v Caunters [1980] 1 Ch 297,330. In the Commonwealth see also Gartside v Shefield Young and
Ellis [1983] NZLR 37; and White v Jones, above n 14; but compare Seale v Perry [1982] VR 193; and
Weir v J. M. Hodge & Son 1990 SLT 266. In America recovery is permitted on a mix of third-party
beneficiary and negligence theories (see for example Melvin Aron Eisenberg "Third-Party
Beneficiaries" (1992) 92 Colum LR 1358 1395).
54 Gartside v She#ield Young and Ellis, above n 52, 51 (per Richardson J).
55 See Bishop (1982), above n 8, 28-29; and Harris and Veljanovski, above n 20,62.
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D Disclaimers
1 The relevance of a disclaimer to a claim by the requestor
In normal circumstances, a contract struck by two parties following their own self
interest is more likely to be optimal than a judicially imposed agreement. Therefore, unless
the market in question is strongly characterized by features likely to lead to inefficient
contractual terms (such as inequality of bargaining power, price discrimination and high
transaction costs) a contractual disclaimer of liability between the requestor and the
provider should be enforced.56 Subject to any statutes limiting the scope of liability
disclaimers, courts typically enforce liability disclaimers.
2 The relevance of a disclaimer to a claim by a third party
Should a disclaimer in the agreement between the requestor and the provider of the
service also affect a claim by a third party against the provider? The case-law on this issue
is unsettled, but appears to favour allowing a disclaimer to block a third party's claim.57
This approach is economically sound if the interests of the requestor and the third party are
aligned in the sense that they will be similarly affected if the provider is negligent. If this is
the case, it is reasonable to rely on the requestor to strike a bargain which is likely to be
optimal with respect to the third party as well. Lord Goff took this approach in White v
Jones58 by suggesting that a liability disclaimer in a contract between a solicitor and a
testator should be effective against an intended beneficiary who takes a negligence action
against the solicitor. However, if the interests of the requestor and the third party are not
aligned then opportunities arise for socially inefficient strategic contracting between the
requestor and the provider.59 That is, the contracting parties may agree to terms that
decrease the total gains to all the three parties in order to increase the benefit from the
transaction captured by the contracting parties. For example, the bean seller and the
56 See generally Landes and Posner (1987), above n 15, 280-284; Shavell (1987), above n 15, 53-64;
William K Jones "Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract over
Tort" (1990) 44 University of Miami L Rev 731; and Steven R Swanson "The Citadel Survives A
Naval Bombardment: A Policy Analysis Of The Economic Loss Doctrine" (1987) 12 Tul Mar LJ
135.
57 See White v Jones, above n 14, 207 (per Lord Goff); Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC
520,534; Leigh & Sillivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd ("The Aliakmon") [1985] 2 All ER 44. 77
(CA); and Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities Ltd [1986] QB 507, 530. A strong opinion in the
other direction was put forward by Lord Brandon in the House of Lords in Leigh & Sillivan Ltd v
Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd ("The Aliakmon") [1986] 1 AC 785 (HL), 817 and 819-820.
5 8 Above n 14, 207.
59 For the discussion of this concept in the context of incentives for a contracting party to remain
silent even though their disclosure would provide a joint benefit to the parties see Ayres and
Gertner, above n 29,94.
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weigher in Glanzer v Shepard6o may agree that the weigher will not be liable for over-
weighings. Although this would decrease the total gains to all three parties, it increases the
share that is captured by the seller and the weigher. This suggests a distinction not
currently present in the case law: in cases where the interests of the requestor and third
party are not aligned, a disclaimer should not generally be effective against a third party
claimant.61
E Summary
The prima facie liability rule coupled with the suggested departures provides a more
consistent and convincing positive theory for the imposition of liability in financial service
cases than is provided either by judges or academics using traditional legal analysis and
concepts such as "foreseeability", "proximity", "just and reasonable" and "assumption of
responsibility". The economic approach is also useful for analysing difficult legal issues
such as the desirability of concurrent liability and what effect disclaimers should have on
third parties.
VI Conclusions
The economic approach provides a powerful lens through which financial service cases
may be examined. It confirms the judicial intuition that pure economic losses are different
from physical losses and that liability should, in some cases, be restricted. More
importantly, it also provides a clearer understanding of the factors that determine what the
appropriate restrictions are. It is submitted that this framework, and the liability
guidelines derived from it, are more convincing and provide a more certain basis for
determining liability than the traditional legal analysis. Although this area of law remains
difficult to understand, the economic approach at least makes sure the cause of the confusion
is better understood.
60 Above n 40.
61 An exception should, however, be admitted, and the disclaimer applied, if the disclaimer
represents a term genuinely consented to by all three parties. An example would be where the
third party was notified of the term before the service was provided and had a chance to
renegotiate. This would allow the parties to set their own terms while minimising the possibility
of non-optimal strategic behaviour.
